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Liability for
Misleading Statements
under Seetion 11

TED J. FIFLIS, Professor of Law, University of
Colorado School of Law, Boulder, Colorado

Speaking generally, § 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933 (hereafter
the "Act"), 15 U.S.C. §77K
(1970), gives purchasers of registered securities a cause of action
against several participants in a
registered offering for an untrue
statement or omission of a material
fact in the final, effective registration statement.
A particular registered offering
may be subject as well to other
liability provisions, such as §10b-5
of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.
The leading cases on §II have
been Escott v. Bar Chris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), and Feit v.
Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp.. 332 F. Supp. 544
(E.D.N.Y. 1971). Another case
(in two opinions) which presumably will be of importance is
Beecher v. Able, [1973-1974

Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 194,450 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
and [1974-1975 TransferBinder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,016
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
SCOPE

The incidence of § 11 was recently extended as a result of the
adoption of Rule 145, which
repealed Rule 133, the "no-sale
rule," and made securities transactions in certain previously exempted reclassifications, mergers,
and purchases of assets for stock
subject to the registration requirements. Since adoption of Rule 145,
a registration statement will be
required in a statutory merger unless an exemption is available, and
misrepresentations or omissions in
the registration statement will be
subject to §11 exposure. However,
on a purchase of assets for securities, Rule 145(3) requires
is-

36

THE PRACTICAL LAWYER

(Vol. 21--No. 7)

tration only if the transfer of assets
is part of a pre-existing plan for
distribution of the securities, or
the asset seller is dissolved or distributes the securities received or
adopts resolutions for dissolution
or distribution within a year of the
vote of its shareholders on the
asset sale.
Section II therefore relates to
all the various types of registered
offerings-direct offerings by issuers, including corporate combinations, reorganizations, and share
for share exchanges, and registered
secondary offerings by persons in
a control relationship with the
issuer, including a parent corporation's use of its subsidiary's securities in a corporate combination,
and vice versa.
Non-registered primary or secondary offerings, including "Reg.
A" offerings, are not covered by
§ 11 but may be subject to other
liability provisions of the securities
acts.
Even if accompanied by a prospectus, oral misrepresentations are
not covered by §11, although an
action may be available under
§12(2) or §17(a) of the 1933
Act, Rule 1Ob-5 promulgated under the 1934 Act, and, in certain
circumstances, §§9, 14, and 15
under the 1934 Act.
PURPOSES

The general assumption is that
§11 liability is not punitive in na-
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ture, though its exclusive purpose
does not seem to be to make the
investor whole. Rather, it appears
to be aimed at effectuating the two
expressed policies stated in the
preamble to the Act: "To provide
full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate
and foreign commerce and through
the mails, and to prevent frauds in
the sale thereof, and for other purposes."
One other matter that may
throw light on §11 is the fact that
the original version of the section,
enacted at the nadir of business
prestige in early 1933, was amended in 1934 as the result of a concerted campaign to weaken its provisions. Numerous changes which
seem incompatible with the major
thrust of § 11 were adopted at that
time. Hence, these clauses are the
product of ultimate compromise
by two antagonistic factions.
PLAINTIFFS

Linear Privity
Section 11(a), a victim of poor
grammar, states:
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part
became effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact
or omitted to state a material fact
required to be stated therein or
necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading, any person
acquiring such security (unless it
is proved that at the time of such
36
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acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at
law or in equity, in any court of
competent jurisdiction, sue . . .
(italics supplied).
Because the phrase, "such security," is an appositive without
a referent, the issue is posed
whether only persons who acquired
a security in the chain of title from
the registered offering-linear privity-may sue, or whether anyone
who acquired a security of the
same class as those registered may
also sue.
Barnes v. Osojsky, 373 F.2d
269 (2d Cir. 1967), and Colonial
Realty Corp. v. Brunswick Corp.,
257 F. Supp. 875 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), held that a plaintiff must
prove linear privity. See also Rudnick v. Franchard Corp., 237 F.
Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),
where an underwriter in the first
of two registered offerings was not
liable to buyers in the second
offering. Hence if the registered
offering is of a class previously
outstanding, or if additional offerings are made, a plaintiff may be
unable to recover if he cannot
sustain his burden of proving linear
privity.
The proposed American Law
Institute Federal Securities Code
(hereafter "ALI Code") §§1403
and 1409 (T.D. No. 2, 1973),
would permit recovery by all persons purchasing subsequent to the
offering statement, the functional

37

equivalent of the prospectus, but it
would prorate the recovery among
all claimants.
Class Actions
Because the misrepresentations
and omissions actionable under
§11 are all contained in or omitted
from a single registration statement, one important characteristic
facilitating class actions is established. As a result, class suits are
common under the section and are
well suited. See H. BLOOMENTHAL,
SECURITIES

AND

FEDERAL

COR-

8-98 (Clark Boardman, New York, 1975).
PORATION LAW

Actions by Underwriters
Professor Loss has suggested
that an underwriter, being one who
"acquired" the securities in a registered offering, may himself have
an action under §11 although he
is also one of the class of defen-

dants. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1723-24, n. 129 (Little
Brown, Boston, 2d ed. 1961).
(This set and the 1969 Supplement, volumes 4, 5, and 6, will
hearafter be cited "Loss.") But he
recognizes the disruption that this
right to sue would cause in the
operation of §11(f), providing for
contribution among the defendants.
6 Loss at 3844.
Priorities on Insolvency
If the issuer is insolvent, there
may be claims against the insol37
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vent estate both by equity security
purchasers suing under §11 and
other non-equity creditors, suggesting a question whether the §11
equity holding plaintiffs should
share on a par with other creditors
or should be subordinated. This
problem arises with other provisions of the securities acts as
well. See Slain & Kripke, The
Interlace Between Securities Regulation and Bankruptcy-Allocating
the Risk of Illegal Securities Issuance Between Security Holders
and the Issuer's Creditors, 48
N.Y.U. L. REV. 261 (1973).
The uniform answer so far has
been that securities act claimants
are creditors regardless of whether
their claims derive from some
equity security, and will share on
a par with other unsecured creditors on insolvency. Four Seasons
Nursing Centers of America, Inc.,
472 F.2d 747 (10th Cir. 1973);
In Re Los Angeles Land & Investments, Ltd., 282 F. Supp. 448
(D. Hawaii 1968); SEC v. Insurance Investors Trust Co., [ 1971-72
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP.
93,259 (W.D. Ky.
1971); Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F.
Supp. 1099 (S.D. Tex. 1970),
petition for writ of mandamus denied in part and granted in part
sub. nom. Ernst & Ernst v. U.S.
Dist. Ct., 457 F.2d 1399 (5th Cir.
1972). Cf. Oppenheimer v. Harriman Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 301
U.S. 206 (1937).
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The rule has been criticized by
Slain & Kripke, supra, who recommend subordination where an
equity holder claims rescission.
The proposed Bankruptcy Act of
1973 §4-406, H.R. Doc. No.
93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973), introduced as H.R. 10792
and S.2565, would subordinate
not only rescission claimants but
even those whose claims are based
on a tort by non-selling defendants.
The ALI Code §1602(d), T.D.
No. 3 (1974), will follow whatever provisions the Bankruptcy Act
contains.
DEFENDANTS

Section I1 also presents some
difficult problems of interpretation
as to who are proper defendants,
although it seems to identify very
specifically several categories. The
questions arise in determining who
belongs in each category.
Section 11(a) lists as possible
defendants:
* Signers of the registration statement;
0 Directors, partners, or near directors and partners of the issuer;
* Experts who are named as having prepared or certified a part of
the registration statement; and
0 Underwriters of the security.
Signers
Section 6(a)

of the Act, 15
38
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U.S.C. §77f(a), specifies those
who are required to sign a registration statement:
[E] ach issuer, its principal executive officer or officers, its principal
financial officer, its comptroller or
principal accounting officer, and
the majority of its board of directors or persons performing similar
functions (or if there is no board
of directors or persons performing
similar functions, by the majority
of the persons or board having the
power of management of the issuer), and in case the issuer is a
foreign or territorial person" by its
duly authorized representative in
the United States.
Since §11(a) seems to be unambiguous in holding every person
who "signed," any ambiguities of
§6(a) presumably will have been
resolved at the time of filing the
registration statement. Those who
signed will be liable, but not those
who did not. But see Douglas &
Bates, The Federal Securities Act
of 1933, 43 YALE L. J. 171, 194
(1933).
Directors and Near Directors
§11(a)(2) and (3) add to the
list of possible defendants:
(2) [E]very person who was a
director of (or person performing
similar functions) or partner in
the issuer at the time of the filing
of the part of the registration
statement with respect to which
his liability is asserted.

39

(3) [E]very person who, with
his consent, is named in the registration statement as being or about
to become a director, person performing similar functions, or partner.
Does a "person performing similar functions" to those performed
by directors include a person who
controls dummy directors? The
dictum in Mersay v. First Republic
Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465,
469 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), indicates so.
More likely, only persons who direct non-corporate issuers, like
general partners, trustees, and associates, are covered. See 3 Loss
at 1724, n.130. The legislative history of § 15 of the Act, dealing
with vicarious liability, indicates
that it is that section that is aimed
specifically at the principal of a
dummy director. S. Rep. No. 47,
73d Cong. 1st Sess. 5 (1933);
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 152, 73d
Cong. 1st Sess. 27 (1933).
Experts
§ll(a)(4) makes liable:
[E]very accountant, engineer, or
appraiser, or any person whose
profession gives authority to a
statement made by him, who has
with his consent been named as
having prepared or certified any
report or valuation which is used
in connection with the registration
statement, with respect to the
statement in such registration
statement, report, or valuation,
39
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which purports to have been prepared or certified by him.
Although ordinarily the phrase
"whose profession gives authority
to a statement made by him" might
be ambiguous, the practical administration of the registration
process removes any doubt, since
the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereafter "Commission")
requires that manually signed consents to be named an expert be
filed with it before the registration
statement will be made effective.
See 3 Loss 1740-41.
It would seem that, as with
"signers," one who signs a consent
will be considered an expert.
Unlike any of the other persons
liable under §11, experts are liable
only if the portion of the registration statement purporting to be
made on their authority is misleading. §11(a)(4).
Underwriters
§11(a) concludes the list of
those liable with "every underwriter with respect to such security."
Because the term "underwriter"
is a word of art, not only are the
managing and participating underwriters held but so too are the
so-called "statutory underwriters"
as defined in §2(11), as well as
the "last moment underwriter"
under §11(d). SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5275 (June 26,
1972), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
ff4506B at pp. 4056-57; Folk,
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Civil Liabilities Under the Federal
Securities Acts: The Bar Chris Case
(Part I1), 5 VA. L. REv. 199, 22734 (1969).
Statutory underwriters may include, for example, controlling
persons as well as lenders who take
shares from controlling persons as
pledges, although the term does
not include selling group brokers
unless they receive special treatment from the underwriters.
Controlling Persons
In addition to the persons
named in §11(a), liability under
§11 may be imposed by §15 of the
Act on certain others. Section 15,
15 U.S.C. §770, reads:
Every person who, by or
through stock ownership, agency,
or otherwise, or who, pursuant to
or in conjunction with an agreement or understanding with one or
more other persons by or through
stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any person liable
under sections 11 or 12, shall also
be liable jointly and severally with
and to the same extent as such
controlled person to any person to
whom such controlled person is
liable, unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the
existence of the facts by reason of
which the liability of the controlled
person is alleged to exist.
Because the "unless" clause,
added by the 1934 amendments,
40
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whose offerings may have to be
registered under §5.
Control persons are not exempted from the registration requirements of §5 if they use a §2(11)
Vicarious Liability
Further, vicarious liability may statutory underwriter to make a
be imposed on persons other than distribution, as those terms are
those specified by §§11(a) and 15 defined by the Act and Rule 144.
by operation of common law rules If the sale is but a "link in a chain
through which seof agency or aiding and abetting. of transactions
from
an issuer to the
curities
move
See especially In re Caesar'sPalace
be
registered. Preit
must
public,"
Securities Litigation, 360 F. Supp.
Rule
144. A perNote
to
liminary
366, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (aidrelationship,"
son
is
in
a
"control
ing and abetting a §11 violation);
SEC v. Management Dynamics, as defined in the last sentence of
Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Bind- §2(11), if he controls an issuer,
er] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. is controlled by an issuer, or is
under common control with the
195,017 (2d Cir. 1975) (SEC
as in a brother-sister corissuer,
enforcement proceeding, principal
poration
relationship.
held liable for agent's fraud under
a person in a "conTherefore
the analogue to §15 and §20(a) of
whose shares
trol
relationship"
the Securities Exchange Act of
under §5 will
be
registered
must
1934, and Rule lOb-5; §20a held
to
§11
liability unnot
be
subject
vito supplement and not restrict
less he is in that one type of "concarious liability.)
There may be some question trol relationship" whereby he is
whether persons who control dum- the one who is in control, because
my directors are covered, not by §11 itself does not list control persons as defendants and §15 in§15, but by §11(a)(2) and (3),
which imposes the same liability cludes only the "controlling perthat directors face upon "persons son" who controls someone.
performing similar functions" as
ELEMENTS OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM
directors.
Misrepresentations
and Omissions
Security Holders in
Misrepresentations of fact, halfControl Relationship
Conspicuous by their absence truths, and omissions of facts refrom §11(a) as potential defend- quired in the registration stateants are security holders in a "con- ment, if material, are actionable
trol relationship" with the issuer, when contained in or omitted from
41
gives a special defense to control
persons, it will often be important
to determine whether one is liable
under §15 or §11(a).
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the effective registration statement.
However, misrepresentations and
omissions from other documents,
such as the "red herring" prospectus, are not actionable under § 11.
What are "facts" and what are
"material facts" are questions of
no small moment. See Schneider,
Nits, Grits and Soft Information
in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L.
REV. 254 (1972); Kripke, Rule
lOb-5 Liability and "Material"
"Facts," 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1061
(1971). Literal-mindedness as to
what constitutes a fact is not in
consonance with recent decisions,
which have held that estimates of
an insurance company's excess reserves are facts, Feit v. Leasco
Data Processing Equipment Corp.,
332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y.
1971), as are projections of profits,
Beecher v. Able [1973-1974

OCTOBER 15

it was reasonable to rely upon it.
W. PROSSER, TORTS 725 (West
Publishing, St. Paul, 4th ed. 1971).
Accountants still urge in their
pleas for a "better understanding"
of accounting by lawyers that auditors' reports are merely "opinions."
The misunderstanding is on the
other side.
Subsequently Discovered Facts
and Updating

Because §11(a) speaks of misrepresentations
and
omissions
when the registration statement
became effective, two quite similar
situations receive differing treatment. The draftsmen, apparently
concerned in §11 with maximizing
the possibilities for an honest registration statement, required only
that it be true when made-i.e.,
when effective.
Thus, representations that were
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 194,450 (S.D.N.Y. true when made, but which sub1974). But see Heller, Disclosure sequently become false because
Requirements Under Federal Se- circumstances changed, are neither
actionable under §11 nor require
curities Regulation, 16 Bus. LAWpost-effective amendments to the
YER 300, 307-08 (1961), protesting that such information is not registration statement. See I Loss
293.
"facts."
On the other hand, representaThe common law recognized
tions
that were false when made,
that an utterance was actionable
if misleading even though it was although the falsity is not discovan opinion, and the emphasis was ered until later, are actionable
on "material," not on "fact." While under §11, and require "postprojections were not facts under effective" amendments to the regearly common law cases, an attor- istration statement. See 1 Loss
ney's opinion of law could be mis- 219.
leading if, under the circumstances,
For other fraud sections of the

1975
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securities acts, both types of cases
are treated as misleading. Fischer
v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Fiflis, Current
Problems of Accountants' Responsibilities to Third Parties,28 VAND.
L. REV. 31, 128-30 (1975). Both
types of cases would seem to invoke the doctrine of SEC v. Manor
Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d
1082, 1096-97 (2d Cir. 1972),
which held that a prospectus true
when made, but which later became false, is not a prospectus for
purposes of §5 requiring delivery
of a prospectus on sale of a security. The case would clearly apply where the prospectus was false
from the start but the falsity was
discovered belatedly. See Folk,
Civil Liabilities under the Federal
Securities Acts: The Bar Chris
Case (Part II), 5 VA. L. REV 199,
256-266 (1969).
Unfulfilled Projections
Projections frequently appear in
prospectuses. Although projections
were specifically prohibited only in
proxy solicitations under the Note
to Rule 14a-9, the Commission
had a basic policy against any projections in prospectuses until two
years ago. Gerstle v. GambleSkogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d
Cir. 1973); Thomas Bond, Inc.,
5 S.E.C. 61, 71 (1939); T. FIFLIS
& H. KRIPKE, ACCOUNTING FOR
BUSINESS LAWYERS 472 (West
Publishing, St. Paul, 1971). They
are now permitted but not re-

43

quired. SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 9844 (Nov. 1,
1972 [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
79,075; Beecher v. Able (19731974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 94,450, at p. 95,561
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (by stipulation
of parties). See also the "hot issues" releases and other items
cited in Ruder, Disclosure of Financial Projections, FIFTH ANNUAL

INSTITUTE

ON

SECURITIES

REGULATION 5, 9-10 (Practising
Law Institute, New York City,
1974).
If projections are false when
made because without foundation,
they will result in liability only
when damages occur. Hence, most
often suits probably will not be
brought unless the projections do
not eventuate or some other factors cause a decline in values. In
the latter event, the "comparative
causation" concept of §11 (e) may
apply. On the other hand, a projection may not be false even
though it later fails to occur.
One important case involving
projections was a §11 case, only
recently completed at the trial
level. Beecher v. Able [19731974, Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 794,450 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), and [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
f195,016 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In the
first opinion, the Court held that
predictions in a prospectus that
43
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Douglas Aircraft would break even
for a particular year were materially false because of a failure to
disclose some uncertain assumptions underlying the forecast and
the fact that prior projections had
been quite inaccurate. In the second opinion, the Court considered
damages under §11(e).
On the other hand, in Dolgow
v. Andersen, 53 F.R.D. 664
(E.D.N.Y. 1971), afl'd, 464 F.2d
437 (2d Cir. 1972), where the
Court held merely that the action
could not proceed as a class action,
it said that an unmet projection
was probably not a misrepresentation even though the underlying
assumptions were not stated. Perhaps the cases can be reconciled
on the basis of the reasonableness
of the assumptions under the circumstances. See generally, Comment, 16 B.C. IND. & COMM. L.
REV. 115 (1974).
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circular way-e.g., a fact is material to a reasonable man if an
ordinary person would, or might,
consider it important, or if it is a
matter as to which an average
prudent investor ought reasonably
to be informed before purchasing.
These definitions are not useful
except to begin the inquiry, which
seems to boil down to whether the
trier of fact believes that an investor justifiably relied.

The determination of the court
is not always convincing. In Escott
v. Bar Chris Construction Co., 283
F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
the Court found a misstatement of
the current ratio at 1.9 to I rather
than 1.6 to 1 to be material, while
an earnings overstatement of 16
per cent was not material where
actual earnings had increased from
$441,103 for 1959 to $1,496,196
for 1960, instead of the misrepresented increase to $1,742,801.
The most interesting treatment
Pleading
The pleading of misrepresenta- of materiality was in Feit v. Leasco
tions or omissions under §11 is Data ProcessingEquipment Corp.,
not regulated by Rule 9(b) of the 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y.
1971), where Judge Weinstein
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
articulated
several features of the
which requires pleading of fraud
Among
other things, he
concept.
with particularity. Schoenfeld v.
pointed
out
that
materiality in a
F1973-1974,
Giant Stores Corp.,
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. formal document such as a prospectus is more readily established
L. REP.
94,460 (S.D.N.Y.
than when the same words are
1974).
used informally, and that it differed with the various antifraud
Materiality
The formal definitions of mate- provisions of the securities acts
riality tend to use synonyms in a and with the nature of the com44
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munication as an affirmative statement or omission.
Defendants' Culpability
A plaintiff need not establish
the defendant's knowledge of, or
negligence concerning, the untruth,
or the foreseeability of the harm
or an intent to cause it, although
a defendant other than the issuer
will have certain due diligence
defenses.
Causation
A plaintiff need not show that
the purchase was caused by the
misrepresentation, unless he acquired the security after an earnings statement for a 12 month
period after the effective date of
the registration statement was
made generally available to the
issuer's security holders. Even
then, reliance may be established
without proof of the reading of
the registration statement. §11(a).
The possibility of reliance on an
unread registration statement has
puzzled many. Doubtless, this language in §11(a), being one of the
1934 amendments, was the result
of some pushing and shoving by
the antagonists and is not completely clear. However, one of the
draftsmen explains it by suggesting
that the seller's claims, communicated to the buyer, will be based
on the registration statement. See
letter of James M. Landis to Felix
Frankfurter dated December 4,

45

1933, quoted extensively in R.
CHATOV,

THE COLLAPSE OF COR-

PORATE

FINANCIAL

REGULATION:
ACCOUNTANT

STANDARDS

A

STUDY OF
INTERACTION

SEC150
Cal.,

(Ph.D. Dissertation, U.
Berkeley, 1973).
Furthermore, reliance by an investor on the unread untruth could
also be the result of an investment
advisor's recommendations based
on the registration statement, Rudnick v. Franchard Corp., 237 F.
Supp. 871, 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),
as well as reliance on the market
price as being based on legal disclosure. Cf. Competitive Associates, Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein,
Horwath & Horwath, [19741975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC.

L.

REP.

95,090 (2d Cir.

1975); Reeder v. Mastercraft
Electronics Corp., 363 F. Supp.
574 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
THE MEASURE

OF DAMAGES

A contract measure of damages
would give a plaintiff the difference
between what he paid and the
value, at that time, of what he
received. Section 11(e), however,
uses a different measure, complicated with variables, resulting in
eight different possible combinations. In addition, it establishes a
special measure for underwriters,
and provides all defendants with
a "comparative causation" defense.
Because of the various combinations, it is impossible to state the
45
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general measure in a simple sentence. The statute uses three
clauses in a compound sentence,
which, when paraphrased, say:
The general measure of damages
for all except underwriters is the
amount paid by the plaintiff, or the
public offering price, whichever is
less, minus:
' The value at the time of suit, if
the securities have not been resold
before judgment;
*The sale price received, if the
securities have been resold in the
market before suit; or
• The higher of value at time of
suit or price received on resale, if
the securities have been resold
after suit but before judgment.

15

sale rather than "in the market?"
If the defendant is an underwriter, his liability is further limited unless he received some special benefit from the issuer. The
outside limit for an underwriter is
the total offering price of the
securities underwritten by him and
actually distributed to the public.
This outside limit is based on the
price of the securities sold, not on
the damages incurred, and should
be contrasted with the underwriter's liability under §10b-5. ChrisCraft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, [1974-1975

Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L.

95,058 (2d Cir. 1975).
Regarding the measure of damages generally, see Cherner v.
Transitron Electronic Corp., 221
F. Supp. 48 (D. Mass. 1963);
Fox v. Glickman Corp., 253 F.
Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Beecher v. Able, [1974-1975
REP.

In a recovering market, a plaintiff's attorney must be careful to
tell the client that he may recover
less if he resells the security than
if he holds it.
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
95,016
(S.D.N.Y.
Numerous complex questions L. REP.
1975).
may arise, making the formula
even more difficult. For example,
Under the ALI Code, § 1403 (h),
the "value" even of publicly traded Reporter's Revision of Text of
securities unsold at the time of T.D.'s Nos. 1-3 (1974), there
suit may not be trading price. Feit would be a general $100,000 per
v. Leasco Data Processing Equip- defendant limit of liability for
ment Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 negligence on all but underwriters
(E.D.N.Y. 1971). Cf. Beecher v. and issuers, except that for deAble, [1974-1975 Transfer Bind- fendants whose gross revenues exer] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ceed $10,000,000, the limit is 1
195,016 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). And per cent of their gross revenues,
what is the value of a security sold to a maximum of $1,000,000. See
before suit if the sale is a distress T.D. No. 2 Comment e, p. 106.
46
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Concomitantly, recovery is to be
prorated among all the potential
claimants. ALI Code §1409.
Comparative Causation

As a result of the 1934 amendments, §11(e) was altered to permit a defendant to prove that any
portion of the damages did not
result from the untruths in the part
of the registration statement upon
which his liability is asserted.
The opponents of this amendment probably comforted themselves with the thought that, as a
practical matter, it could never be
effectively invoked. That was the
view held by two able commentators. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH,
SECURITIES

REGULATION,

CASES

(Foundation
Press, Mineola, N.Y., 2d ed.
1968). But Feit vs. Leasco Data
Processing Equipment Corp., 332
F. Supp. 544, 586-587 (E.D.N.Y.
1971), has given the words a
powerful effect.
AND MATERIALS 810

In that decision, Judge Weinstein reasoned that the share values
would have declined proportionately to the Standard & Poor's
Daily Stock Price Index, and he
therefore diminished the measure
of damages in the same proportion.
In Beecher v. Able [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 95,016, at p. 97,560
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), Judge Motley
endorsed the Leasco technique but
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found that the defendants there
had failed in their burden of proof,
offering numerous items of evidence to show that the security's
value probably would not have
dropped. However, even in this
case, the plaintiffs had made a
concession based on the concept of
§11(e).
The ALI Code has adopted this
proviso for all kinds of cases, not
limiting it to §11 type situations.
The comments refer to the concept
as "comparative causation." See
§1402(f)(2)(A) and comments
thereto in T.D. No. 2 (1973).
Rescission
The 1934 amendments introduced some enigmatic language
concerning the relief available to
the plaintiff.
The words of §11 (a) permitting
suits "at law or in equity" and of
§11(e) that the suits authorized
under §11(a) "may be to recover
such damages" leave open the
question whether the plaintiff is
limited exclusively to the defined
damage liability of §11(e) or
whether he may obtain equitable
relief such as rescission.
In certain circumstances, rescission may be more favorable to a
plaintiff than damages and may
invoke equity practices and procedures not otherwise applicable.
Still, the infirmities of a common
law rescission action, described in
Shulman, Civil Liability and the
Securities Act, 43 YALE L. J. 227,
47
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231-33 (1933), would perhaps be
applicable to an action for rescission based on §11.
A consideration of the history
of the 1934 amendments repealing,
inter alia, an express rescission
remedy, is relevant. Section 11 (e)
had originally read: "The suit
authorized under subsection (a)
may be either (1) to recover the
consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the
amount of any income received
thereon, upon the tender of such
security or (2) for damages if the
person suing no longer owns the
security."
Section 12(2), which now reads
as the original §11(e) had read,
allows, according to Independence
Shares Corporationv. Deckert, 108
F.2d 51 (3d Cir. 1939), an action
merely for money damages and
not for equitable relief. But the
Supreme Court, reversing in Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp.,
311 U.S. 282, 287-88 (1940),
held that although the ultimate recovery under §12(2) must be
limited to what is permitted thereunder, the form of action or the
procedure employed may include
a claim for equitable relief under
the "Act as a whole" and §22(a),
which permits enforcement in
equity or law of all liabilities under
the Act.
Both of the same grounds apply
equally under §11(e) as it now
reads. Furthermore, the plaintiff
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should be able to add a count under §12(2) and seek rescission or
other equitable relief, following the
Supreme Court's decision in Deckert. I. 1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964), and Mills v. The
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S.
375 (1970), further strengthen
this view. But see Gerity v. Cable
Funding Corp. [1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,205, at n.4, p. 94,874 (D. Del.
1973), where the court left unresolved the question whether liquidation and dissolution could be
decreed under §11.
Under the original act, "rescission" presumably could be had
against all the defendants. Rescission under the amended act might
seem to be available only against
the petitioner's immediate sellerperhaps an underwriter or dealer.
But see the recent case allowing
rescission against a non-seller under Rule 10b-5. Gordon v. Burr,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,874
(2d Cir. 1974).
DEFENSES

The Issuer
The only substantive defense of
the issuer under §11 is that the
plaintiff knew of the untruth or
omission at the time of his acquisition. Of course, any defendant
will seek to refute the affirmative
elements of the plaintiff's case or
to introduce facts that require the
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plaintiff to go forward with evidence. Thus, the issuer may show
that it had issued a 12 month earning statement and force the plaintiff to prove reliance on the misleading facts in the registration
statement.
Furthermore, the comparative
causation defense of §11(e) may
be established by the issuer. Perhaps if rescission or other equitable
relief is applicable, equity doctrines
of laches and unclean hands will
also be available, although there
are no cases on these matters.
The issuer has no "due diligence" defense of the type available to all other defendants.
Non-experts
In addition to the defenses and
opportunities to shift the burden
of going forward available to the
issuer, all other defendants have
certain additional defenses under
§I1(b).
Withdrawal
Any defendant may prove that
he withdrew from the office and
relationship described in the registration statement, and notified the
Commission and the issuer in
writing before the effective date.

§11(b) (1).
Due Diligence
Of more significance are the due
diligence defenses of §11(b)(3).
Although non-experts are responsible for the entire registration
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statement, their duties of diligence
are diminished for the expertised
portions, and need merely negative
belief and any reasonable ground
for believing the statements in the
expertised parts were untrue.
§11(b) (3)(C).
As to the remainder of the registration statement, they have a
duty to investigate the facts to
establish an affirmative belief and
reason to believe in the truthfulness of the statements. §11(b)
(3)(A). The standard of reasonableness is that of the "prudent
man in the management of his own
property." §11(c).
The facts that will establish
these defenses and the right to
delegate these duties will vary with
circumstances.
Experts
Due Diligence
Experts are responsible only for
the expertised portions. §11(a).
They have a duty to investigate
the facts to establish an affirmative
belief and reason to believe in the
truthfulness of these portions.
§11(b) (3)(B).
Somewhat incongruously, the
same standard of reasonablenessthat of "a prudent man in the
management of his own property"
-applies to experts and non-experts. Does this mean that an
auditor must audit as though he
were working for himself? Prob-
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ably not. See the Bar Chris opinion
requiring auditors to follow the
standards of their profession. But
the statutory language arguably
may permit a court to hold an
expert to a higher standard than
that of his profession when the
custom is not supported by learned
reason. See Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountants' Responsibilities to Third Parties, 28 VAND. L.
REV. 31, 83 (1975).
An expert is any accountant,
engineer, appraiser, or person
whose profession gives authority
to a statement made by him.
§11 (a) (4).
An expertised portion of a registration statement is any part of
the registration statement which
was prepared or certified or which
is copied from or extracted from
a report or valuation which was
prepared or certified by an expert
whose name is mentioned with his
consent.
Because of the holding in Bar
Chris, supra, it has generally been
assumed that an accountant is an
expert only with respect to audited
statements. While that is, at least
in part, a factual question, under
the typical existing practices, admittedly only the audited statements are expertised.
Because what is "expertised" is
a question of fact to some extent,
the diligence duty of non-experts
is not as strong for the expertised
portions, and experts are liable
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only with respect to their expertised portions, there may be a conflict of interest between experts
who would seek to minimize the
extent of expertised portions and
the non-experts who would want
to maximize it. An attorney should
be careful to note the conflict
when the registration statement is
being prepared.
Withdrawal
An expert has the same defense
of withdrawal and notification as a
non-expert.
Controlling Persons
Controlling persons who are liable vicariously would seem to
have the benefits of defenses established by their subordinates,
although this is not entirely clear.
They have a further defense under
§ 15 if they show they "had no
knowledge
of or reasonable
grounds to believe in the existence
of the facts by reason of which the
liability of the controlled person is
alleged to exist."
Does this clause require the
controlling person to make an investigation? Does it merely mean
that if he knows of suspicious circumstances he must inquire further? Is mere absence of evidence
of falsity a defense? Will his duty
be higher when the sale is his own
secondary offering? Does he have
a duty to supervise the controlled
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person so as to become aware of
facts which would have put him
on notice? Will the duty vary as
the persons controlled vary from
the issuer to underwriter to accounting firm? See Folk, Civil Liabilities under the FederalSecurities
Acts: The Bar Chris Case (Part
II), 5 VA. L. REV. 199, 218-223

(1969).
MULTIPLE PARTY LIABILITY

The liability of all the defendants, with the possible exception
of controlling persons, is joint and
several. §11(f). Thus, a plaintiff
need not sue all the potential dedendants, and, for example, if the
issuer is solvent, he may consider
suing only the issuer to avoid establishing an array of defense
attorneys against him and because
the issuer has no due diligence
defense.
Whenever more than one person
is liable, problems of contribution
and indemnification arise. The
problems are exacerbated under
the securities laws for several
reasons:
* Section 11 (f) and other sections
provide express rights of contribution, thereby altering the normal
common law rules concerning contribution among joint tortfeasors;
* Often contracts for indemnity
are in existence, especially between
issuers and underwriters and issuers and their officers and directors;

UNDER SECTION I1
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* Each of the defendants is likely
to have varying degrees of relationship to the wrong, with the
result that those less closely related will believe they should not
bear the ultimate loss;
0 At times the parties may have
been misled one by the other, thus
invoking many calls for indemnification; and
* Huge sums are often at stake,
making the pressure to seek indemnity or contribution great.
As a result, attorneys involved
in securities litigation face difficult
problems in this area in virtually
every case.
Since §11(f) permits contribution "as in cases of contract," it
has been said that contribution
should be pro rata without regard
to fault, though it should not
be available on behalf of or against
controlling persons liable under
§15, and experts may not be entitled to contribution against nonexperts who establish their own
diligence as to expertised portions.
Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.
J. 171, 179, 196 (1933). But see
Gould v. American-Hawaiian SS
Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 169-72
(D. Del. 1974).
Some other specific problems
under §11(f) seem worth raising:
0 Given the express grant of a
contribution right, is indemnity to
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be denied? In a case under Rule
lOb-5, but following §11(f) by
analogy, contribution was allowed
and indemnity denied, at least
where both parties were guilty of
the fraud. Globus v. Law Research
Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d
Cir. 1969) (indemnity denied);
318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (contribution permitted on
remand). Indemnification would
seem to work contrary to the policy of the Act to deter misrepresentation.
* Since most issuers are corporations that can perpetrate acts only
through directors and officers,
should a corporation be entitled to
indemnity from its directors and
other servant-agents liable under
§11? See the analogy in deHaay
v. Empire Petroleum Company,
286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo.
1968).
0 Section 11(f) specifies that if
the first person held "liable was,
and the other was not, guilty of
fraudulent misrepresentation,"
there should be no contribution.
Aside from the difficulties suggested in this language in the case of
corporations that are issuers, and
the problems of defining terms,
what if the only person initially
sued was guilty of mere neglect
and another is guilty of fraudulent
misrepresentation? Will this fortuitous order of events mean that
the first person held is stuck with
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part of the liability or should the
fact that had he not been sued by
the victim he would have no liability to make contribution entitle him to sue for full indemnity?
0 If a plaintiff sues only the issuer,
will the issuer have a duty to seek
contribution or indemnification? If
the same persons are directors
when the liability arose and when
the issuer pays the judgment, they
would have a conflict of interest.
See the SEC brief in opposition to
corporate issuer's petition to allow
it to pay the full liability in Feit
v. Leasco, F1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
f93,415.
0 If the terms of a settlement
whereby the issuer pays more than
its share of the liability are not
disclosed, is this a failure to disclose a material fact in connection
with a purchase or sale of a security so as to be actionable under
§10b-5? Perhaps disclosure itself
will not avoid the application of
§10b-5 under one aspect of Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d
215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
* If a partial settlement is made,
say, with one of two defendants,
what will be the liability of the
settling defendant to contribute to
the non-settling defendant?
* What is the applicable statute
of limitations for a contribution
action under § 1 (f) or for contri52
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bution or indemnification actions
otherwise? When is it initiated and
tolled?
0 For § 11 (f) contribution actions,
the broad venue and service provisions of §22(a) will apply, but
what of actions for contribution or
indemnification otherwise? See
Miller v. Hano, 8 F.R.D. 67, 71
(E.D. Pa. 1947), holding that no
independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction is required. The
venue would seem to be appropriately identical to venue for the
main action. Lyons v. Marrud,
Inc., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
[92,307 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). But
jurisdiction over the person is a
different matter, and must be independently established. U.S. v.
Rhoades, 14 F.R.D. 373 (D. Colo.
1953) (involving the Housing and
Rent Act of 1947). See 3 Loss
1739 and 6 Loss 3855 for further
treatment.
Many of these questions have
been addressed at least in part in
several decisions. Many more
cases will be required before clear
rules can emerge.
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

The Statute of Limitations, §13
of the Act, will cause the action
to expire one year after discovery
of the misrepresentation or omission should have been made and
not later than three years after a
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bona fide offer to the public.
The plaintiff must plead and
prove the non-expiration of the
limitations period, in accordance
with the usual federal rule for
periods of limitation that are part
of the substantive cause of action.
Rosenberg v. Hano, 121 F.2d 818
(3d Cir. 1941).
JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND SERVICE

Under §22 of the Act, jurisdiction is concurrent with state and
territorial courts and removal is
prohibited.
Venue is placed "in the district
wherein the defendant is found or
is an inhabitant or transacts business, or in the district where the
offer or sale took place, if the defendant participated therein."
Process may be served in the
district of venue, any other district
in which the defendant is an inhabitant, or wherever the defendant
may be found.
SECURITY FOR COSTS

Under §I1(e), a court may require security for costs, including
attorney's fees, from any party
under any section of the 1933 Act,
and if the suit or defense is found
to be without merit, it may tax
costs after judgment. §11(e) was
intended to avert strike suits.
The court's determination is
generally not appealable. Donlon
Industries, Inc. v. Forte, 402 F.2d
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rights of contribution under other
sections. See deHaas v. Empire
Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809
(D. Colo. 1968); Globus v. Law
Research Service, Inc., 318 F.
Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); and
especially Folk, Civil Liabilities
under the Federal Securities Acts:
The Bar Chris Case (Part 11), 5
INTERACTION WITH OTHER
VA. L. REV. 199 (1969).
SECTIONS
This overlap is one of the prinSection 11 may not exhaust the
possibilities of recovery for mis- cipal targets of the ALI Code
representations and omissions in project. Avoiding overlaps is gensecurities sales. See Stewart v. Ben- erally commendable as a matter
nett, 359 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass. of neatness. But given the present
1973), for a summary of the vary- availability of numerous remedies
ing views. But see Blue Chip for misleading prospectuses, in
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 95 weighing the fairness of the ALI
Code, one cannot merely compare
S. Ct. 1917, 1933, at n.15 (1975),
which may renew the enthusiasm §11 with proposed §1403. It is
of defense attorneys to argue necessary to also consider the efagainst the availability of other fect of removal of present rights
of action under the other fraud
provisions.
As previously noted, in the provisions of the Act.
Second Circuit, a misleading pros- CONCLUSION
pectus is no prospectus at all for
Close analysis of §11 yields a
the purpose of meeting the re- surprising quantity of difficult
quirement of delivery of a prospec- questions under this most explicit
tus on sale of a security. SEC v. of the securities acts' civil liability
Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 provisions. One must anticipate
F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972). Since that the newly perceived potency
§12(1) gives a private action for of the section will yield a greatly
non-delivery of a prospectus, it increased flow of decisions in the
may be that a plaintiff could ob- near future. In the meantime, practain rescission or damages under titioners would be well-advised to
§12(1) for a misleading prospec- take a second look at what at first
tus.
glance may seem to be a simple
Much of the law of §11 may provision imposing civil liability
have substantial effects on analo- for misleading registration stategous requirements of diligence and ments.

935 (2d Cir. 1968). See Klein v.
Adams & Peck, 436 F.2d 337 (2d
Cir. 1971) (not appealable since
not a final order, and claims of
abuse of discretion are so unlikely
to succeed as not to justify the
expense of appeal).

